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Abstract—Regulators are aiming to incentivize developers 
and Distribution Network Operators to connect distributed 
generation (DG) to improve network environmental perform-
ance and efficiency. A key question is whether these incentives 
will encourage both parties to connect DG. Here, multi-
objective optimal power flow is used to simulate how the par-
ties’ incentives affect their choice of DG capacity within the 
limits of the existing network. Using current UK incentives as 
a basis, this paper explores the costs, benefits and trade-offs 
associated with DG in terms of connection, losses and, in a 
simple fashion, network deferral.  
 
Index Terms—incentives, distributed generation, losses, op-
timization methods, power generation planning. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
EDIUM and long term targets have been set by the 
United Kingdom (UK) Government to lower the car-
bon intensity of energy supply. The Renewables Obligation 
requires 10% of electricity to be supplied from renewable 
sources by 2010. A further 10 GW of ‘good quality’ com-
bined heat and power (CHP) is required by the same period. 
In the decade up to 2010, these challenging targets will re-
quire the connection of up to 20 GW of distributed genera-
tion (DG), much within distribution networks.  
Connection of DG is known to be technically challeng-
ing with a wide variety of well-documented impacts includ-
ing voltage rise, which tends to be the dominant effect in 
rural networks [1]. While the mitigation of adverse impacts 
is well established, there have been concerns that deep-
connection charging models which oblige developers to 
fund, upfront, the full capital costs of connection, are acting 
as a disincentive to DG [2]. Further concerns included the 
fact that the developers were not being rewarded for bene-
fits that DG could provide [2]. These include improved en-
vironmental performance, reduced losses and the opportu-
nity to defer network reinforcement arising from increasing 
loads. 
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One of the key ways of reducing barriers to DG is 
through the use of Distribution Use of System (DUoS) 
charges that apply shallower connection charges and reflect 
the costs and benefits associated with DG. Borrowing from 
transmission methods, several approaches have been pro-
posed to allocate the costs of network development and 
losses between demand and generation [3]-[5].  
In the UK, Ofgem regulates DNOs through five-year 
distribution price controls. It considered introducing a full 
DUoS system for the 2005 to 2010 period [6] but, instead, 
adopted an interim scheme that provided some incentives 
for DNOs to connect DG and develop their systems eco-
nomically. With this scheme in place for much of the pe-
riod to 2010, it is important that it incentivizes both DNOs 
and DG developers to maximise connections of DG.  
This paper explores the current incentives available for 
developers of DG and the DNOs in the UK and offers a 
brief international comparison (Section II). In Section III it 
presents a multi-period multi-objective Optimal Power 
Flow (OPF), as a means of examining whether current UK 
incentives will facilitate the connection of greater volumes 
of DG. Section IV and V present and discuss the implica-
tions of a case study. 
II.  INCENTIVES AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION  
This section takes a closer look at the incentives for DNOs 
and developers, the two main players in the DG market. 
A.  Network Connection and Use 
Assuming rational economic behaviour, the objective of 
DG developers will be to maximise returns from electricity 
sales or, in the case of CHP, minimise the cost of energy 
imports. Broadly speaking, these will tend to be met with 
increased installed capacity but they will be significantly 
influenced by DNO policies on connection and use of sys-
tem charges.  
Internationally, the incentives and practices for connect-
ing DG are very diverse. Many countries use deep charging 
(e.g., Australia, Ireland) while others (e.g., Italy, France, 
Norway) apply shallower charges [7]-[8]. In the United 
States, customers are liable to pay costs exceeding a regula-
tor-determined connection ‘allowance’ [7]. Most systems 
do not currently apply DUoS charges to DG except in a few 
cases, including Sweden (DG>1.5 MW [3]) and the UK. 
Before April 2005, DG connecting to UK distribution 
networks was charged the full capital costs of connection, 
and capitalised O&M costs instead of DUoS charges. As 
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part of the price control, DG connecting post-April 2005 
pay the following DUoS charges [6]: 
1. a 15 year annuity charge based on 80% of the cost of re-
inforcement works required to connect the DG, if any. 
2. an annual capacity charge of £1.50/kW of DG capacity 
installed in lieu of remaining reinforcement cost.  
3. an annual operations and maintenance (O&M) charge of 
£1/kW of DG capacity to recover appropriate costs. 
The charges incentivize the DNO to connect DG by provid-
ing a return in excess of the normal regulated rate of return, 
provided there is a reasonable level of take up and use of 
connected generation and the costs of connection are rela-
tively low [8]. 
Ultimately, the cost of network connection and usage is 
primarily driven by the match between the capacity of the 
DG and the network to which it is connecting. Where a DG 
development is larger than can be accommodated at a given 
location, the traditional approach has been to upgrade the 
network to the detriment of scheme economics. Given the 
UK incentives for DNOs, there is benefit to DNOs and de-
velopers in reducing the capital costs associated with rein-
forcement. While active network management [9] will 
make a significant contribution, there remains a need to 
identify and encourage DG connections at locations and 
capacities that make best use of the existing network [10]-
[13]. With UK DNOs publishing network data in Long 
Term Development Statements, such analyses are increas-
ingly within reach of developers.  
The current UK DUoS appears to offer both developers 
and DNOs incentives that tend to encourage increases in 
DG capacity. However, the picture is complicated by other 
incentives, not least those relating to losses. 
B.  Losses 
7% of electricity generated in Great Britain is lost as dis-
tribution losses [14]. Marginal losses are higher and may be 
up to 30% at the extreme edges of the networks [3]. While 
losses are inevitable, they can be managed through invest-
ment in low loss equipment, more effective network con-
figuration and energy efficiency [14]. Additionally, losses 
can be significantly influenced by DG: injections of power 
at lower voltages tend to reduce losses but, where these 
greatly exceed demand, losses may increase overall. Al-
though the DG impact on losses is site and time specific, 
losses tend to follow a U-shaped trajectory [15].  
Until 2005 the only DNO incentives for reducing losses 
were through loss adjustment factors (LAFs) [16] with site-
specific LAFs applied at 33 kV and above. The price con-
trol incentivizes DNOs to manage losses by providing re-
wards for loss reductions and penalties for increases rela-
tive to a target level. Each DNO’s annual target is set by 
Ofgem and values losses at £48/MWh (in 2004 values). 
This is aimed at encouraging DNOs to undertake the neces-
sary investment to reduce losses [6]. However, given the re-
lationship between losses and DG penetration, DNOs may 
be exposed to DG-induced losses where larger volumes of 
DG connect. As such, the ability of modest penetrations of 
DG to reduce losses could incentivize DNOs to limit con-
nections within their networks. This potential is important 
given the larger relative loss incentive (£2.50/kW per year 
is equivalent to £48/MWh for a source operating only 51 
hours/year). The other major area of concern is that devel-
opers are not fully incentivized for their impact on losses.  
Among the wide range of practices internationally, most 
European countries require DNOs to purchase losses with 
the rest tending to specify standard loss levels backed by 
penalties for non-compliance [8]. Spain and Portugal have a 
hybrid approach that rewards reductions below a standard 
level whilst requiring increases to be purchased from the 
energy pool. As in the UK, the DNOs bear the risk of DG 
impacts on losses. 
C.  Deferral of Network Upgrades 
A further major area where DG can have a significant 
impact is through deferment of network reinforcement that 
would otherwise be required to meet load growth. The 
value of substituting DG for network capacity can be sig-
nificant. A study of four US DNOs [17] suggested average 
marginal distribution capacity costs range from US$74 to 
US$556/kW with individual area marginal costs of up to 
US$1,795/kW. These are similar to the AUS$1500/kW re-
ported for parts of Sydney, Australia [18]. While the value 
attributed to the deferral of network upgrades is heavily de-
pendent on the reliance that can be placed on the DG to 
produce power at times of peak load, rewarding DG that 
defers network reinforcement would provide a valuable lo-
cational signal. 
Although mechanisms for recognising network deferral 
benefits of DG are being developed for the UK, there is no 
formal mechanism within current network costing models. 
Primarily, this is due to the demand-oriented security stan-
dard, Engineering Recommendation (ER) P2/5 mandatory 
in DNO planning. Developed in the 1970s, ER P2/5 defined 
the network capacity required to meet demand for prede-
fined outage conditions and simply did not recognise the 
potential for security contributions from newer DG [4]. Al-
though a new standard ER P2/6 now provides a basis for 
quantifying contribution to system security [19], it still does 
not provide a mechanism for recognising the benefit.  
D.  Coherent Incentives? 
The loss incentive for DNOs appears to contradict the 
connection incentives for developers and DNOs. With a 
more cost reflective distribution charging model in devel-
opment it is also important to examine the incentives of-
fered by network deferral and explore the impact of these 
on the desire to connect DG to distribution networks. 
III.  DEFINING OPTIMAL DG CAPACITY USING              
MULTI-PERIOD MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPF 
The basic assumption is that both developers and DNOs 
will aim to maximise their benefits from connecting DG 
whilst minimising any costs. These objectives can be simu-
lated using techniques used to optimally locate DG capacity 
within the operational or planning constraints of existing 
networks [10]. The constraints typically include voltage 
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limits, thermal limits of circuits, fault levels, stability and 
protection. By constraining the optimisation within existing 
technical limits the cost of network reinforcement that oth-
erwise would be required to connect larger DG can be 
avoided by both developers and DNOs. 
Here, a multi-period multi-objective optimal power flow 
has been developed to determine optimal DG capacity. It is 
derived from the OPF methods of [10] and [11] and the 
ε-constrained multi-objective OPF technique of [20]. The 
major change here is the extension to a multi-period formu-
lation. This is designed to capture the impact of varying 
demand levels on losses and other network factors and al-
lows a more realistic estimate of the value of the loss incen-
tive. To limit the computational burden, the load curve is 
discretized into appropriate loading bands. Fig. 1 shows an 
example with four load bands: maximum, normal work 
hour, medium and minimum. A further extension has been 
the representation of network deferral benefit.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Load duration curve 
A.  Multi-Objective Optimal Power Flow 
A multi-objective optimal power flow (MO-OPF) problem 
simultaneously maximises several objective functions 
amongst a set of feasible solutions, Ω [20]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]Tmffff xxxx ,...,max 21=    (1) 
such that 
 Ω∈x           (2) 
,...,n, jc j 21       0)( ==x       (3) 
  21        0)( ,...,p,khk =≤x      (4) 
The vector x consists of a set of controllable quantities, 
e.g., generator output, and dependent variables. f(x) is the 
vector of objective functions and cj(x), hk(x) represent the 
equality and non-equality constraints, respectively. Here, 
the objective functions are the developer’s and DNO’s. 
    1)  DG Representation and Capacity 
It is assumed that the DG offers a firm supply of energy 
and operates continuously at rated capacity. In maximising 
DG capacity the objective function is constructed such that 
coefficients reflect the benefits and costs of DG capacity: 
 )( ggg PCf =  (5) 
Here, Cg is the benefit derived from generator g with a ca-
pacity Pg (MW). The DG capacity at a location may be lim-
ited by the energy resource available:  
 
maxmin
ggg PPP ≤≤  (6) 
While distributed voltage control or active management al-
lows larger DG capacities [9], [21] by flexibly controlling 
reactive power (Qg), most DG currently operate in power 
factor control mode. An appropriate constraint ensures this: 
 
2 2cos .g g g gP P Q constφ = + =  (7) 
    2)  Network Constraints 
To date, only the major network constraints on DG ca-
pacity of voltage, thermal and fault level constraints have 
been incorporated within the OPF formulation. For simplic-
ity, only the first two are considered here. While this might 
limit its application in fault-level dominated urban net-
works it is acceptable for voltage dominated rural systems. 
Quality of supply standards require voltages to be main-
tained close to nominal: 
 
maxmin
bbb VVV ≤≤  (8) 
where minbV  and 
max
bV  are the lower and upper bounds of 
the bus voltage Vb. The thermal capacity, maxtS , of circuit t 
also limits the maximum apparent power transfer, St: 
 
max
tt SS ≤  (9) 
    3)  Network Deferment 
The deferment model assumes a very simple case where 
specified network elements have been identified as requir-
ing reinforcement to cope with demand increases. Impor-
tantly, the benefit that arises from connecting DG is inde-
pendent of the DG location within the network, i.e. all DG 
capacity contributes equally. An example of this would be 
where transformers at grid supply sub-stations are ap-
proaching capacity and, without DG contributing to peak 
load, would otherwise require early upgrading. With the 
DG units assumed to provide a firm supply, the benefit ap-
plies to the entire DG capacity. 
    4)  Objective Functions 
The incentives given to developers and DNOs to en-
courage DG connection will vary from system to system. 
Here, the arrangements currently applicable to the UK are 
used to illustrate the analysis, although other systems could 
be represented in a similar fashion. 
Earlier versions of the OPF approach [10]–[11] used an 
objective dependent only on DG capacity connected and 
giving a good approximation to the benefit (i.e., net reve-
nue) earned by the developer. It has been extended to cater 
for the DNO, offer a multi period approach, as well as ex-
plicitly representing current UK DUoS and the more gen-
eral case incorporating network deferment benefits.  
The developer’s annual objective function is computed 
from a weighted sum across all four load bands (B), each of 
h(B) hours duration: 
 ( )∑∑ +−=
g
gDG
CC
g
DG
g
B
DG PDCBCBhf )()(  (10) 
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Here DGgC  represents the developer’s net revenue per kW 
of DG capacity connected (£/kW), CCgC  is the combined 
capacity and O&M charge per kW of DG capacity (£/kW) 
payable to the DNO and DDG is the portion of the benefit 
arising from deferral of network upgrades that accrues to 
the developer (£/kW). There is no cost associated with net-
work reinforcement as the analysis constrains DG capacity 
within the network limits.  
The DNO objectives are significantly different. It re-
ceives an annual payment, CCgC , from the developer for 
every kW of DG connected. The loss incentive values 
losses at CL (£/MWh) and rewards or penalizes losses rela-
tive to the target level. The DNO objective function is also 
computed from a weighted sum across all four load bands 
according to: 
 
( )








−+
+
=
∑
∑
))()((
)(
BLBLC
PDC
Bhf
ATL
g
gDNO
CC
g
B
DNO
 (11) 
Here, LA(B) and LT(B) are, respectively, the actual and tar-
get losses (kW) and DDNO is the portion of the benefit aris-
ing from deferral of network upgrades that is retained by 
the DNO (£/kW of DG installed).  
As the DNO and developer incentives are different it is 
likely that each will perceive different ‘optimal’ locations 
and capacities for DG. By comparing the two outcomes, 
and through the use of trade-off techniques, it may be pos-
sible to define a range of compromise solutions offering a 
potentially better arrangement for DG under the current in-
centive scheme. 
B.  Trade-off analysis 
With multi-objective problems an infinite number of 
non-inferior solutions can be generated where improvement 
in one objective would result in degradation in the other. 
The decision-maker must subjectively choose the final 
compromise solution and different methods have been pro-
posed to assist with this task [22]-[24]. There are two ap-
proaches: (1) a single criterion of choice automatically de-
fining the compromise, e.g., max-min [25]; and (2) interac-
tive procedures which allow the decision-maker to follow 
the decision process.  
Here, an interactive approach based on the ε-constrained 
technique [20], [26] is adopted to obtain a set of non infe-
rior solutions from which the most satisfactory solution can 
be subjectively chosen. In the technique, one objective 
function (N) is selected as the ‘master’ objective and the 
other ‘slave’ objectives become new constraints. The for-
mulation becomes: 
 f N )(max x              (12) 
such that 
N i,...,m ,ifi ≠=≥  and 21)( ix ε     (13) 
with constraints (2)-(4) applying as before. iε  represents 
the lower limit of the ith objective, given by iii εεε ∆−=
*
 
where *iε  is the global non-inferior value of the ith objec-
tive in (1)-(4) and iε∆  represents the trade-off preference 
of the decision-maker. 
The procedure then applies the concept of significant 
dominance to reduce the number of comparisons. One al-
ternative solution, X, significantly dominates another, Y, if 
at least one attribute of Y is ‘much worse’ than the corre-
sponding one of X and if no attribute of Y is ‘significantly 
better’ than X’s [27]. This definition is used to rule-out sig-
nificantly dominated alternatives leaving a ‘knee set’ con-
taining those that are not. These would then be analysed by 
the decision-maker in making their final subjective choice 
or using a direct method like max-min [25]. 
C.  Implementation 
The method was implemented in Matlab using some 
features of the approach in the MATPOWER suite [28]. Its 
use is illustrated in the following case study. 
IV.  CASE STUDY 
The technique was applied to a 69-bus 11 kV radial dis-
tribution system having two substations [29]. The voltage 
limits are taken to be ±6% of nominal and the thermal lim-
its for lines are 1.5 MVA. The complete network data are 
given in [29] but the network diagram is shown in Fig. 2 
along with seven potential DG locations. All DG are as-
sumed to have fixed power factors of 0.9 lagging.  
 
TABLE I 
ORIGINAL AGGREGATE NETWORK LOADING AND LOSSES 
LOAD   
BAND 
DURATION 
[H] 
ACTIVE 
POWER 
[MW] 
REACTIVE 
POWER 
[MVA] 
LOSSES 
[MW] 
Minimum 2920 1.788 1.224 0.034 
Medium 2920 2.682 1.836 0.078 
Normal 2847 3.576 2.448 0.142 
Maximum 73 4.470 3.060 0.228 
 
The loading at each bus is assumed to follow the load 
curve in Fig. 1, with four distinct loading levels considered. 
The mean aggregate network load is just under 2.7 MW and 
the loading levels for each band are given in Table I. The 
maximum load levels for each bus are given in [29]. The 
initial levels of losses in each band are also given in Table 
I; the weighted average of 85 kW is 3.2% of consumption. 
The DNO incentives from the UK are applied with the 
DNO receiving £2.50/year for every kW of DG connected 
( CCgC ), and losses valued at £48/MWh (CL). For illustra-
tion, the target loss level has been taken to be the initial loss 
levels with no DG connected. 
The developer receives the proceeds of energy and car-
bon credit sales net of the fuel costs, annual payments to 
the DNO, O&M, etc. The fixed cost of each DG is taken to 
be £1/hour and the linear net benefit function offers 1p/kW 
per hour at buses 13, 27, 35, 40 and 65 and 0.8p/kW per 
hour at buses 5 and 57.  
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Fig. 2. 69-bus Network with DG unit locations 
 
Three separate analyses have been conducted to assess 
the implications of these differing incentives for prefer-
ences for DG capacity. The first applies the benefits and 
costs for the developer and DNO as specified for the UK 
and does not recognise any benefit arising from network 
deferral. The second recognises a network deferral benefit 
for the DNO in addition to the initial incentives. The third 
examines the case where the network deferment benefit is 
shared between the DNO and developer. In each case, the 
opportunities for compromise between the parties are ex-
plored using trade-off analysis. 
A.  Optimal DG Capacities with Current UK Incentives 
The OPF was run to capture the viewpoints of the de-
veloper and the DNO using their respective objective func-
tions, (10) and (11). With network deferral benefits for both 
parties (DDG and DDNO) set to zero, the DG capacities that 
would be selected for each of the seven locations are given 
in the middle columns of Table II.  
 
TABLE II 
OPTIMAL DG CAPACITIES (MW): NO DEFERRAL BENEFIT 
LOCATION DNO DEVELOPER MAX-MIN 
SOLUTION 
5 0.413 1.353 0.784 
13 0.165 0.307 0.277 
27 0.459 1.049 0.751 
35 0.477 1.307 0.762 
40 0.465 0.623 0.945 
57 0.531 1.188 1.270 
65 0.399 0.696 0.492 
Total 2.909 6.524 5.281 
 
It is apparent that the total capacity that would be added 
by the DNO is only 45% of that deemed optimal by the de-
veloper. Here, the developer’s desired capacity of over 6.5 
MW is limited only by network voltage constraints which 
explains the larger spread of capacities. 6 of the 7 DGs 
would be larger than 0.6 MW and the developer would tend 
to concentrate capacity in fewer DG: 3 DGs account for 
60% of the total. By contrast, the DNO would opt to con-
nect roughly equal-sized DGs (0.4–0.5 MW).  
If the loss incentive was not present, the DNO’s optimal 
connection would be broadly that of the developer. It would 
be identical only if the developer had specified equal bene-
fits (i.e. no preference between locations); in this case the 
value of the benefit is arbitrary [10]. As such, it is the in-
clusion of the loss incentive that alters the benefit of DG as 
perceived by the DNO. It results in a far more even spread 
of capacity which is logical given the U-shaped loss trajec-
tory: the loss incentive is tending to promote a more modest 
penetration of capacity to avoid the large losses associated 
with the reverse power flows experienced with the larger 
DG favoured by the developer.  
The influence of plant capacity and siting on losses can 
be clearly seen in Table III. Relative to the target losses of 
85 kW, the DNO’s optimal arrangement sees losses reduce 
by 83% to an average of 15 kW. The developer’s optimal 
scheme results in losses that exceed target by a third. The 
impact on losses across the load bands is more complex: 
the DNO would opt for losses at minimum load of around 
half the original value with the changes for the middle two 
bands slightly higher than the average. For the developer, 
losses at minimum load would be 125% higher than origi-
nal, the middle two bands showing modest increases while 
losses at peak would show a slight (8%) drop: this empha-
sises the benefit of DG operating during peak load.  
 
TABLE III 
LOSSES (MW): NO DEFERRAL BENEFIT 
LOAD DNO DEVELOPER MAX-MIN 
SOLUTION 
Minimum 0.017 0.077 0.004 
Medium 0.009 0.107 0.044 
Normal 0.017 0.152 0.069 
Maximum 0.042 0.210 0.108 
Average 0.015 0.113 0.039 
 
TABLE IV 
DNO AND DEVELOPER REVENUE: NO DEFERRAL BENEFIT 
 DNO DEVELOPER MAX-MIN 
SOLUTION 
DEVELOPER 
REVENUE [£/YEAR] 176,920 465,640 365,290 
DNO REVENUE 
[£/YEAR] 37,035 -13,405 18,120 
 
The value attributed to losses has a significant impact on 
the revenue accruing to the parties under their respective, 
optimal, schemes (Table IV). With the DNO scheme the 
loss reduction provides cash inflows in excess of £37,000. 
The developer’s optimal set up results in an outflow for the 
DNO as losses significantly exceed the target; the net loss 
to the DNO relative to its own optimal exceeds 
£50,000/year. Imposition of the DNO optimal capacity sees 
developer revenue fall by 62% or just under £290,000.  
Essentially, these two contrasting situations see either 
the developer or DNO benefiting at the expense of the 
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other. As such, using trade-off analysis it may be possible 
to find suitable compromises. 
B.  Trade-off Analysis 
Fig. 3 shows the large number of non-inferior solutions 
found by varying the trade-off preference of the decision 
maker (∆εi) for both developer and DNO objectives. The 
smaller knee set was extracted by defining ‘much worse’ as 
6.5% of the difference between the values of the worst and 
best alternatives for the DNO objective, and defining ‘sig-
nificantly better’ as 6.5% as the equivalent for the devel-
oper objective. These solutions are concentrated towards 
the centre of the Pareto front (Fig 3). The knee set com-
promises imply relative reductions in both parties’ revenue: 
for the developer the reductions are 20-25% (with £18,000 
spread) while the DNO’s fall by 45-54% (£3,500 spread).  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Pareto solutions for DNO and developer objectives with no deferral 
benefit. 
 
To illustrate the changes in DG capacity and location 
implied within the knee set, details of one of the solutions 
has been extracted and the detailed capacities, losses and 
revenues are given in the fourth column of Tables II to IV. 
This represents the max-min solution and was found by ap-
plying an adapted version of the max-min method of [25]. 
In overall capacity terms, the knee set solutions are lower 
than developer’s optimal but much larger than the DNO’s 
optimal. For the max-min solution, the developer’s revenue 
is 22% lower while the DNO’s revenue is 51% lower than 
its optimal. For most of the locations the DG capacities lie 
between the original optimal values. Losses follow a simi-
lar pattern with losses raised by 1.8 times relative to the 
DNO arrangement but down by one fifth from the devel-
oper’s optimal. The changes in capacity and losses have a 
significant impact on both parties’ revenues: the devel-
oper’s falls by £100,000 relative to its own optimal but up 
£190,000 on the DNO arrangements. For the DNO the 
magnitude of the revenue changes are smaller but more 
significant in that the worst case under the developer’s ar-
rangements would turn a loss into a modest profit.  
It appears that for this case the non-inferior solutions of 
the knee set offer compromises that tend to raise the in-
stalled capacity without penalising either party excessively. 
C.  Impact of Network Deferral Benefit 
The assessment was repeated for two cases to capture 
situations where the benefits of deferring network invest-
ment are specifically recognised: 
(a) £250/kW annual deferral benefit retained by the DNO 
(b) £250/kW annual deferral benefit split between the 
DNO and developer in the ratio of 60%:40%. 
As necessitated by the simple model of network deferral it 
was assumed that these are associated with upgrading the 
sub-station transformers. 
The results for case (a) are given in Table V and VI. 
Where the DNO retains the benefit the developer’s incen-
tives and, consequently, the capacities, revenues and losses 
remain as before. However, the additional £250/kW of DG 
has a major impact on the DNO as it effectively raises the 
connection incentive by two orders of magnitude. The in-
centive is now sufficiently large to relegate the loss incen-
tive with the DNO opting to connect almost as much DG as 
the network technical constraints allow, i.e., it effectively 
matches the developer’s optimal arrangements. The very 
slight differences in capacity between the two parties (13 
kW overall) can be attributed to the residual effect of the 
DNO loss incentive and the variation in benefit across the 
developer’s sites. These factors are also reflected in the 
slight differences in losses and revenue (Table VI). The 
most significant change is in DNO benefit which rises to 
more than £1.6 million; this is clearly driving the DNO’s 
change in behaviour. The DNO’s new optimal arrangement 
has a minimal impact on the developer’s revenues given the 
minimal differences. 
With the parties now apparently incentivised to act in ef-
fectively the same way, the trade-off is of minimal value. 
However, for completeness the max-min solution is given 
in the fourth column of Tables V and VI. The entire knee 
set covers a range of DNO and developer objective values 
of £200 and £800, respectively.  
 
TABLE V 
OPTIMAL DG CAPACITIES (MW): £250/KW DEFERRAL BENEFIT FOR DNO 
LOCATION DNO DEVELOPER MAX-MIN 
SOLUTION 
5 1.367 1.353 1.353 
13 0.293 0.307 0.307 
27 1.049 1.049 1.049 
35 0.977 1.307 1.125 
40 0.943 0.623 0.798 
57 1.231 1.188 1.188 
65 0.651 0.696 0.696 
Total 6.511 6.524 6.517 
 
For case (b) where £250/kW is split in the ratio of 
60%:40% between the DNO and developer there are rela-
tively few differences with the DNO benefit case. For the 
developer, as the value is equal for all DG units and the ca-
pacity is constrained by the technical limits of the network, 
there is no change in optimal arrangement. However, the 
additional revenue boosts developer benefit by £650,000 to 
over £1.1 million. Although the deferral benefit for the 
DNO is lower it is still sufficiently large to promote signifi-
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cant connection (6.504 MW) of DG that essentially match 
the developer’s. Again, this implies similar levels of losses 
(104 kW). The DNO’s optimal revenue stands at £967,590, 
well above the original amount. Due to the similarity of 
both parties’ optimal arrangements, the knee set spread is 
very narrow: £5,000 and £2,000 for the DNO and devel-
oper, respectively.  
To check the validity of the deferral benefit cases, sev-
eral other values for the deferral benefit were tried. While 
the revenues were significantly impacted the capacity out-
comes were not significantly affected. 
 
TABLE VI 
REVENUE AND LOSSES: £250/KW DEFERRAL BENEFIT FOR DNO 
 DNO DEVELOPER MAX-MIN SOLUTION 
DEVELOPER 
REVENUE [£/YEAR] 463,490 465,640 465,020 
DNO REVENUE 
[£/YEAR] 1,618,200 1,617,600 1,618,000 
AVERAGE LOSSES 
[MW] 0.105 0.113 0.108 
V.  DISCUSSION 
It is clear from this analysis that the incentives provided to 
DG developers and DNOs have a major impact on the par-
ties’ opinion of optimal penetrations of DG. Under the cur-
rent UK incentive schemes, which do not formally recog-
nise the potential benefits for network deferral, there are 
significant differences in terms of the amount of DG that 
the developer and DNO would optimally connect. It ap-
pears that for the DNO, the more significant incentive asso-
ciated with loss reduction outweighs the direct benefit of 
connecting DG. The trade-off analysis applied in this case 
indicated that a series of compromises are available that 
could promote lower losses and higher DG capacities. 
However, as long as developers are not exposed directly to 
their impact on losses they will seek to connect as much 
capacity as possible and in the least number of units.  
There is the issue of whether the DNO has the ability to 
constrain generation at the planning stage for reasons other 
than system security. The only lever the DNO has currently 
is the LAF which allows location-specific loss charging at 
33 kV and above. Should there be only minor differences 
between locations it would be unlikely to fundamentally al-
ter the developer’s choices. As such, where a developer 
opts to connect a large generator that gives rise to signifi-
cant losses, the DNO must look for alternative means of 
minimising losses. 
A deliberately simple approach was taken in considering 
the effect of recognising network deferral benefit. How-
ever, a clear result is that network deferral benefits offer a 
potentially significant means of promoting appropriate be-
haviour from the DNO and developer. This is linked to the 
relative size of the benefit compared to other DNO consid-
erations. It is clear that while the simple approach was ef-
fective in examining the impact on DNO incentives, a uni-
form benefit throughout the network is most unlikely to be 
applicable in all cases. One extension would be to attribute 
different deferral benefits to each DG where they are evi-
dently contributing to separate deferral cases. However, a 
more sophisticated approach that automatically detects and 
accounts for each deferral opportunity is required. With fur-
ther work an approach similar to [30] could be imple-
mented within the OPF framework. 
Although this paper is based primarily on the current 
UK incentives, many of the outcomes should be applicable 
elsewhere. The objectives of DG developers will be broadly 
similar, particularly in liberalised systems. The incentives 
for DNOs are perhaps not too dissimilar as some systems 
levy capacity charges which are similar to the kW charges 
levied on UK DGs. Additionally, the aim of the incentives 
offered by standardised loss levels and loss purchasing is to 
reduce or at least control losses, which is the same as the 
UK. The inclusion of the deferral benefit should extend the 
applicability of the results further. Clearly application of 
the analysis to other countries would require adjustments to 
the values of the costs and benefits recognised. For exam-
ple, systems with time-dependent loss costs could be mod-
elled using several loss values. 
Overall, the work highlights the need for a proper distri-
bution pricing scheme for the UK. Such a pricing scheme 
would provide economically efficient network prices and 
incentives arising from the marginal impact of each user on 
network costs [4]. It would need to be based on an audit-
able method that considers both marginal loss coefficients 
and DG investment deferral benefits. While several ap-
proaches meeting these requirements are outlined in the lit-
erature [31]-[32], a number of specific schemes are cur-
rently being considered for the UK. These include Long 
Run Incremental Cost [3], Time of Use Location Specific 
[4], and Distribution Investment Cost Related Pricing [5]. 
These methods more fully reflect the costs and benefits of 
DG and should promote equitable connection. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the different incentives for developers 
and DNOs and how these influence the optimal connection 
of DG within existing networks. Despite the use of UK 
mechanisms, the approach should be broadly applicable 
elsewhere. Using a multi-objective OPF, it was shown that 
developers and DNOs would tend to connect DG in signifi-
cantly different locations and capacities. A major factor 
was the influence of a DNO loss reduction incentive and a 
trade-off analysis identified several opportunities for com-
promise between the parties. The incentive offered by DG 
deferring network reinforcement was shown to have a ma-
jor impact on the behaviour of the parties. Overall, the 
work highlights the need for a proper distribution pricing 
scheme that fully reflects the costs and benefits in order to 
promote equitable connection for DG.  
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